WATCH COUNTRY
China
The U.S. research-based pharmaceutical industry, as represented by PhRMA, believes that the United States
Government should support the establishment of China's Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status, since the
maintenance of an open and liberal trading relationship is in the interest of both countries. The establishment of
China's NTR status should provide the foundation for seeking further improvements in China's business and
commercial practices that will bring them into line with the global standards of the World Trade Organization, to
which China seeks accession. PhRMA member companies China strongly support the WTO Accession bid of
the Government of China, conditioned on Chinese implementation of WTO-consistent intellectual property
protection and market access disciplines. Given the current environment for industrial property and barriers to
market access for pharmaceutical product, PhRMA requests China's placement on the 2000 "Special 301" Watch
List.
Protection of Intellectual Property
Exclusive Marketing Rights: In 1992, the U.S. and China negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) to provide 7.5 years of marketing exclusivity to U.S. pharmaceuticals not introduced during a designated
"Administrative Protection" period (1986-1992). Chinese law implementing the agreement states that anyone who
has not obtained a certificate for Administrative Protection (AP) is prohibited from manufacturing or selling the
subject product during the term of exclusivity. The law also provides that the owner of the certificate can request
the authorities to stop local companies from manufacturing or marketing the pharmaceutical, and can institute
legal proceedings to recover economic damages for infringement.
In 1994, however, new legislation was passed (Notice 72) that nullifies this protection for U.S. pharmaceuticals.
Notice 72 states that domestic pharmaceuticals which were given approval by MOH during the examination of
AP for a foreign manufacturers shall be considered a legally marketed and manufactured and shall not be
considered an infringement of AP. This loophole encourages MOH to grant certificates to local companies for
copies of products before the AP certificate is granted to foreign manufacturers by the now defunct SPAC.
Furthermore, industry intelligence indicates that MOH certificates are being granted even if the local company has
not complied with all MOH regulations or is not truly ready to market the product.
According to the 1992 MoU, Article 2 of the regulations for Administrative Protection provides that: "The
competent Chinese authorities will prohibit persons who have not obtained a certificate for Administrative
Protection from manufacturing or selling the subject product during the term of Administrative Protection."
Enforcement of Administrative Protection has been governed by Article 18 and 19 of the Regulations which were
approved by the State Council and promulgated by the former SPAC in December 1992. Article 18 provides that
the MOH under the State Counsel and provincial municipal health authorities shall not allow anyone other than
the patent owner who has obtained Administrative Protection from manufacturing or selling the product. Article
19 provides that the Administrative Protection Certificate owner can request the authorities under the State
Council to stop local companies from manufacturing or marketing the pharmaceutical. The Administrative
Protection Certificate owner also can institute legal proceedings in the people's court to recover economic
damages.
PhRMA believes that Notice 72 is not consistent with Articles 18 and 19 of the Administrative Protection
Regulations cited above. Paragraph two of the Notice states that the pharmaceuticals (applied for by local
companies) which were approved by the Ministry of Public Health during the examination of Administrative
Protection shall be considered as legally marketed and manufactured and shall not be considered as an
infringement of Administrative Protection. As such, Notice No. 72 clearly violates the period of marketing
exclusivity provided for in the MoU.
Enforcement of Patent Protection: The products that were patented under China's new patent law in 1993 will
soon be reaching Chinese patients. PhRMA members expect the Chinese Government to enforce the intellectual
property protection that these products are due under China's laws. These same members are concerned, however,
that difficulty they have encountered in trying to ensure protection of "Administratively Protected" products -
and enforcement of the "Administrative Protection" program in accordance with the January 1992 China-U.S.
MoU - will mean that China may not be willing to ensure close enforcement of its patent law once their
patent-protected products become available on the market in China. PhRMA urges the U.S. Government to seek
clarification from the Chinese Government as to how the program of Administrative Protection will be
implemented by the SDA. The U.S. Government also should seek a revocation of Notice 72 and a reinstatement
of the 7.5 years of marketing exclusivity in China for products protected by Administrative Protection. In
addition, industry seeks enforcement to stop local companies from all research, development or marketing
activities relating to products protected by Administrative Protection.
Anti-Counterfeiting Efforts: Counterfeiting of drugs, particularly in Guangdong Province has significantly
increased in the past year. We acknowledge the recent promulgation of regulations regarding drug circulation and
administrative sanctions. However, there needs to be strengthened enforcement which requires the allocation of
additional resources. The problem is so serious for some PhRMA Member companies that they have already
spent the time and resources to close several factories within a twelve month period.
Data Exclusivity: There also are serious concerns regarding the confidentiality of product registration
information during the registration process for imported products, localization (domestic manufacture), and, as
mentioned above, administrative protection. Too often, the foreign company discovers during the registration
process that domestic competitors begin manufacturing the generic of the product. Much of the domestic
manufacture is of counterfeit products, particularly for products which are being localized. From the packaging, it
is often difficult to distinguish the counterfeit and real product. For import and administrative protection products,
often the domestic product obtains legitimate licenses. However, many PhRMA member companies believe that
too much processing of information is required in the application process and this information is secretly passed
on to the many research institutes (some evidence of this has been discovered) throughout China with the result
being the appearance of domestic generics.
Barriers to Market Access for Patented Pharmaceutical Products
National Treatment: In efforts to gain control of health care spending, the State Development and Planning
Commission (SDPC) proposed price/profit controls on drugs to regulate the pharmaceutical market in late-1996.
The SDPC's price and profit control regulations entered into force on December 1, 1998, despite strong
objections from the U.S., European Commission (DG-I), and Switzerland that the new pricing regime violates the
WTO's "National Treatment" principle.
The Chinese Government's imposition discriminatory price controls on pharmaceuticals in December 1998 is the
most serious issue currently facing the research-based pharmaceutical industry in China and raises major
questions about future investments in China. Recently, we have learned that the SDPC's regulations are being
mirrored by equally serious protectionist actions at a provincial level. Recently, Guangdong province limited
increases in sales of medicines by Chinese "medical units" to a maximum of 15 percent annually. It further
directed "medical units" to limit their purchases of imported and foreign joint venture pharmaceuticals to no more
than 30 percent of total purchases. If fully implemented, the Guangdong directive would represent a sharp cut in
sales of imported and foreign medicines. Similar WTO-inconsistent measures reportedly are being considered by
other Chinese provinces.
The Chinese government stated that the purpose of the price controls is to reduce unfair competition by
controlling the prices of joint-venture products (i.e., joint ventures between state and foreign companies), and
stimulate company mergers to eliminate low-quality manufacturers. The international industry believes, however,
that the new price control system is a means for the Ministries to "jockey" for power and an effort to help/protect
state-owned enterprises from foreign competition. For imported products, the SDPC shifted pricing authority
away from the former State Pharmaceutical Administration of China (SPAC) to SDPC's own Price
Administration Bureau (PAB), an agency which does not have direct knowledge of the pharmaceutical sector or
foreign investment in that sector. In addition, the SDPC has strengthened its price control mechanisms through
provincial price bureaus.
PhRMA understands that the national price and profit controls will be phased in. There are indications that the
controls will affect some companies and some sectors of the Chinese health care system before others. From the
previous drafts of the price regulations to which PhRMA and its member companies were given access, the
following was clear:
(1) The proposed price control regulations, on their face, discriminate against foreign pharmaceutical products
and thus appear to be fundamentally inconsistent with the World Trade Organization's "national treatment"
principle.
(2) In violation of GATT Article III:4 and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
("TRIMs"), the proposed Chinese regulations (a) promote "import substitution," (b) establish different and less
favorable procedures and formulas for pricing imported pharmaceuticals, and (c) bestow an array of benefits on
Chinese-made products that are not afforded to "like" imported products.
(3) The Chinese government also appear to violate GATT Article III:4 by removing disproportionately large
numbers of imported drugs from the National Essential Drug Reimbursement List for purposes of promoting
import substitution. Such de facto discrimination contravenes the WTO's national treatment principle.
(4) The proposed regulations lack transparency and invite protectionist abuses.
PhRMA continues to believe that the price and profit control regulations constitute a major market access barrier
to U.S. pharmaceutical exports. Such regulations have disastrous implications for future sales of research-based
U.S. pharmaceuticals in China's rapidly expanding market. While China is fully capable of building an
internationally competitive, research-based industry, this important goal cannot be achieved unless the
pharmaceutical market is opened up to foreign competition without discriminatory regulatory barriers.
Furthermore, intellectual property must be adequately protected, and investment in innovative research and
development adequately rewarded. While Chinese officials have claimed that the most recent version of the
controls offer improvements over previous drafts, PhRMA remains deeply concerned about the controls and the
way in which they could be implemented. PhRMA understands the details of the controls in their most recent
form as follows:
The research-based pharmaceutical industry requests the U.S. Government's support in deterring the Chinese
Government from implementing discriminatory and onerous price controls on foreign manufactured
pharmaceuticals, and by pursuing the Chinese Government's demonstration of national treatment and
transparency principles to the pricing system for this important sector as a condition for WTO accession.
Specifically, PhRMA's goals include:
Too often the research-based industry discovers that although its domestic counterparts have been consulted,
PhRMA member companies have not been consulted or we have been consulted too late to have any impact on a
future policy/regulation. Regarding national drug price policy, we have already witnessed several stages of reform
and adjustment. Now, a new policy will be issued heading in a different direction again. Drafts need to be
circulated for comment. Transparency from the beginning to the end of the regulatory process is crucial for
market efficiency because transparency leads to the development of consistent policy. Transparency and
consistency are needed by the foreign research-based industry not only to properly evaluate investment decisions
into facilities, but also because it can often take several years to introduce a prescription drug to a market so that it
can reach profitability.
Customs Duty, VAT and Cost of Distribution: By the time an imported product reaches the patient, the cost
will have risen by at least 80-90 percent, with no value added. This is due to import duties of around 12 percent
(which we believe should be zero on drugs under a "zero-for-zero" tariff arrangement), VAT of 17 percent (which
is zero-rated on ethical drugs in countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom), port clearing charges, drug
inspection (which re-tests products which already have official certificates of analysis from GMP factories
abroad), distribution through the state controlled distribution system and the mark-up made by hospitals on
dispensing to patients.
Moreover, in China a manufacturer must pay VAT on free samples, whereas the providing of free samples is
considered a promotional expense (not subject to VAT) in other parts of the world.
Chinese law only permits a foreign-invested enterprise (the China factory company) to promote and sell products
which it manufactures. Therefore, a company doing business in China is supposed to employ two separate sales
forces to sell the same portfolio of products it sells through one sales force in most other parts of the world.
Imported products must be promoted through foreign representative offices and sold to hospitals by Chinese
distributors whereas locally manufactured products must be promoted by the factory company and may be sold
to a hospital either through a distributor or by factory company itself. Even when a foreign company establishes a
second factory in China, products from the two factories (since at each geographic location the foreign company
would need to establish a separate foreign-invested enterprise company) should be marketed and sold through
separate sales forces. (The only possible exception is if both factory companies are part of a holding company
which, itself, requires significant investment.)
Imported Raw Materials: Chinese policy encourages the local manufacture of the active ingredient and such
policy could significantly adversely affect the future investment plans of foreign companies. For instance, for a
Class I New Drug, the foreign company is not allowed to apply for a patent on the bulk active. However, a
domestic company may apply for a patent on the bulk active. First, this raises immediate concerns about the
development of similar products which could affect the patent rights and market share of the foreign company.
Moreover, the foreign company must be concerned about the future supply of the bulk active, for import of the
bulk active similarly requires a drug import license, renewable every three years. In the future, the foreign
company may be unable to receive approval to renew the drug import license for the bulk active and be forced to
purchase it from a domestic company.
Approval of Investment vs. Approval of Products of Investment Project: In calculating the cost of
investment, the foreign pharmaceutical investor is left with the predicament that only after it builds the factory will
it know for sure which products it will be allowed to manufacture in the factory. First, the approval for investment
occurs earlier than the ultimate approval for products, the approval for a particular product of a company
depending on the anticipated demand and current number and capacity of manufacturers already producing that
product at the time of the foreign company's application. Second, approval of the investment project and products
had previously been by separate government agencies. In the past, several PhRMA Member companies have built
factories, but not been able to register some of the products they intended to manufacture.
Within the past year, the State Drug Administration promulgated the Temporary Regulation for the Establishment
of Drug Manufacturing Enterprises which requires State Drug Administration approval (at the national level) to
establish a new drug manufacturing enterprise (including foreign-invested enterprise). The State Drug
Administration also approves the registration of products. Therefore, since approval of the manufacturing
enterprise is based upon a feasibility study and other contract/application documents which identify the products
to be manufactured, approval of the manufacturing enterprise should also constitute approval of the products
identified for manufacture.
Discriminatory Renewal of Import Product Licenses: Currently, import products receive an import drug
license (formerly called "import drug permit") which is effective for three years. Chinese authorities have stated
that in the future they would only intend to renew a drug import license for one additional three-year period
provided comparable domestically manufactured products have been developed during the six year period. In
other words, if a product has not become "localized" (manufactured in China) within six years, then Chinese
authorities generally would not further renew the import license and the product may no longer be further
marketed in China.
First, domestically manufactured products do not face such restrictions. Second, options available to a foreign
company other than import are not always feasible or are restricted by law. For instance, building a factory in
China is very expensive, costing about US$ 30 Million for a "green-field" site. Toll manufacturing is currently
not allowed and a draft regulation which will likely be implemented in the near future would only allow the owner
to entrust others to manufacture provided the owner already has a factory in China capable of manufacturing the
product. Moreover, licensing is restricted by the fact that at the end of the term of the license the technology is
presumed to be transferred to the licensee, unless otherwise approved, and the licensor does not have the right to
market or sell the product which it has licensed.
PhRMA seeks the full support of the U.S. Government in seeking to overcome the aforementioned trade barriers
for the researched-based pharmaceutical industry in China. Resolution of the problems facing the pharmaceutical
industry in China will help ensure our industry's support for China's WTO accession.
Damage Estimates
PhRMA is currently studying methodology for estimating damages caused by absence of intellectual property
protection in China (Appendix B). It has been difficult to measure precisely the size of China's
pharmaceutical market, and the shares held in that market by foreign and domestic pharmaceutical companies.
Today, there are 12 PhRMA member affiliates in China, which PhRMA estimates enjoy approximately a 12 per
cent share of the China pharmaceutical market of US$6 billion (for finished formulations of western medicines)
or around US$720 million in annual sales.
It also is difficult to determine whether the total number of pirated products (as a percentage of all products on the
market in China) has fallen substantially in the last five years, a result of the enactment of improved intellectual
property protection or improved enforcement of these "IP" laws. PhRMA member companies in China estimate
that a substantial part of the market still is dominated by pirated or counterfeit products, and that market share
could rise from 12 percent to 25 percent, or roughly double current sales if problems in China were rectified.
PhRMA also understands that the Government of China intends to allow GMP plants higher margins for
products they produce. For enterprises seeking a higher price than the controlled price based on quality, safety
and clinical efficacy, a public hearing will be held by the Pricing Bureau of the SDPC to review such an
application. For popular brands of TCMs, applications to see a higher price will be reviewed by the Pricing
Bureau and State TCM Administration.
Lack of Transparency and Consistency: The positive effort of the State Drug Administration in initiating and
developing a regulatory framework for the pharmaceutical industry within the past year should not be overlooked.
However, now as the State Drug Administration solidifies and fills in the regulatory framework, it needs to seek
broader bases of opinion, including feedback from the foreign research-based industry.