In this ICANN UDRP case, Virginia Mason will lose the domain, which she was using to criticize Kelson Pediatric
Partners, her former employer.  The UDRP panel rejected her "freedom of
speech" defense.  

>From the web page:

"I am a former leased employee of Kelson Pediatric Partners, and have
been the practice administrator of Hampshire Pediatrics since August,
1988. This site is owned and maintained by me, and is in no way
connected to either Kelson Pediatric Partners or Hampshire Pediatrics.
Kelson Pediatric Partners in no way endorses any material contained
herein.  My employers, Dr. Andrew J. Schuman, F.A.A.P., Dr. Julius H.
Simon, F.A.A.P., and Dr. Margaret L. Wiegand, F.A.A.P. have graciously
allowed me to obtain and utilize any publicly available information
concerning the affair of Hampshire Pediatrics vs. Kelson Pediatric
Partners to create this site.   However, I am the only one responsible
for the contents of  With the advent of PPMC's, PHO's,
PO's, PPO's , hospital and corporate practice buy-outs, and vast numbers
of other "solutions" alleged to offset decreasing physician
reimbursements and increasing practice overhead, many practices feel
pressured to change.   I put this site in place to document what
happened to Hampshire Pediatrics when they bowed to that pressure.  I
believe that the same thing could happen to anyone else.      Virginia
A. Mason, N.R.E.M.T.I.,


>From the UDRP decision:

CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution          

Under the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy

File Number: CPR003 
Domain Names:
Arbitrator: Louise E. Dembeck

RIGHTS AND LEGITIMATE INTERESTS: Complainant alleges that Respondent has
no rights or legitimate interest with respect to the domain name at
issue. As support for this allegation, Complainant notes that, to the
best of its knowledge, Respondent, whose name is Virginia A. Mason, has
never offered goods or services for sale under the name "kelson," has
never been known as or by the name, nickname or maiden name "Kelson,"
and has no logical connection to or interest in the term "kelson,"
except for her involvement in an ongoing dispute between her employer,
Hampshire Pediatrics, and Complainant. Respondent, on the other hand,
neither claims to have used or intended to use the term "kelson" on or
in connection with the offering of goods or services nor to have been
commonly known by the name "kelson." Rather, Respondent alleges that her
website,  which incorporates the domain name
at issue, "is a freedom of speech cite with no commercial content or

UDRP Paragraph 4(c) provides that Respondent's rights or legitimate
interests in a domain name may be demonstrated, without limitation, by
(i) before any notice to Respondent of the dispute, Respondent's use of,
or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering
of goods or services; or (ii) Respondent has been commonly known by the
domain name; or (iii) Respondent is making legitimate noncommercial or
fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to
misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service
mark at issue.

Respondent's contention that her website "is a freedom of speech cite
with no commercial content or value" seeks to raise a First Amendment
issue and suggests reliance upon the circumstances described in
Paragraph 4(c)(iii) which, if proved by Respondent, could demonstrate
Respondent's rights or legitimate interests in the domain name at issue.

Although deciding a First Amendment Constitutional issue is outside the
scope of this arbitration, several federal court decisions have held
that incorporating the registered trademark of another into one's domain
name in order to attract internet users to a site with competing or
critical views to those of the legitimate trademark owner is not
protected by the right of fair use. [Compare Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
America v. Bucci, 1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 3338 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jews for
Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998), and Bally Total
Fitness v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998).]


BAD FAITH: In support of the contention of Respondent's bad faith
registration and use, Complainant alleges that Respondent's intent in
registering and using the domain name at issue is to disrupt
Complainant's business and tarnish its reputation by luring current and
potential customers of Complainant to Respondent's website where they
will likely encounter respondent's "opinions" as to Complainant's
alleged nonperformance of contractual duties with Respondent's employer
(Hampshire Pediatrics). This is the subject of an ongoing contractual
dispute between Complainant and Hampshire Pediatrics having nothing to
do with the domain name at issue. Respondent contends, as discussed
earlier, that her website is "a freedom of speech site with no
commercial content or value."

Paragraph 4(b) of the UDRP provides that indications of bad faith
include, without limitation, (i) registration for the purposes of
selling, renting or transferring the domain name to the Complainant for
value in excess of Respondent?s cost; (ii) a pattern of registration in
order to prevent Complainant from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name; (iii) registration for the primary purpose of disrupting
the business of a competitor; or (iv) an intentional attempt to attract,
for commercial gain, Internet users to Respondent's web site by creating
a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's mark as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of Respondent?s web site or
location, or of a product or service on Respondent?s web site or

It is clear from the record that Respondent is integrally involved in
the longstanding dispute, between Complainant and Hampshire Pediatrics,
a company in competition with Complainant, and that the outcome of that
dispute, in one way or another, will have an impact on Respondent as the
impact of Respondent's website is likely to inure to the benefit of
Hampshire Pediatrics. I find that the Respondent has registered the
domain name at issue with the primary purpose of diverting present and
potential customers of Complainant to Respondent's website and from
there to the website of Hampshire Pediatrics, thus disrupting the
business of its competitor, the Complainant. Having determined that
Respondent satisfies the criteria for a finding of bad faith
registration pursuant to Paragraph 4(b)(iii), it is unnecessary to
examine the criteria set forth in Paragraph 4(b)(iv).

Accordingly, I find that, whether or not Respondent established and
maintained the domain name for direct or indirect commercial gain,
Respondent did register and use the domain name in bad faith, as that
term is defined in the UDRP.


In light of my findings above that (a) the registered domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's protected mark; (b)
Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest with respect to
the domain name at issue; and (c) Respondent did register and use the
domain name in bad faith, as that term is defined in the UDRP, I find in
favor of the Complainant.